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COMMITMENT, CRAFT, AND THE GOLDEN
CALF: LESSONS IN THE BOOK OF EXODUS
FOR LEGAL EDUCATION
PETER MARGULIES*
INTRODUCTION
A good lawyer is part mechanic and part prophet. The
mechanic metaphor suggests the virtues of process: analysis,
execution, persuasion, and negotiation, while the prophet's
commitment goes to substance: the motivations and aspirations
that drive the practice of a craft.1  While some lawyers'
commitments may center upon wealth maximization, history has
suggested that lawyers are deeply committed to social justice,
the integrity of the legal system, and fairness to individuals.2
* Professor of Law at St. Thomas University. J.D., Columbia University; B.A.,
Colgate University. I thank Jerry Todres for combing his temple's library for
commentaries on Exodus that shed light on the issues raised in this article. I also
thank Steve Friedell, John Garvey, David Gregory, Howard Lesnick, and Jerry
Todres for their comments on an earlier draft.
1 Cf ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 66-74 (1993) (discussing the relationship between "sympathy," which is
described as commitment to and solidarity with a client, and "detachment," which
refers to the ability to assess a client's goals and the means for reaching them
within the context of a larger legal and ethical landscape); Panel Discussion, Does
Professionalism Leave Room for Religious Commitment?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
875, 884-87 (1999) (providing the remarks of Professor Howard Lesnick on the
relationship between religious commitment and professional craft). Of course,
process and substance can overlap. See Peter Margulies, Multiple Communities or
Monolithic Clients: Positional Conflicts of Interest and the Mission of the Legal
Services Lawyer, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2339, 2359-61 (1999) (considering conflicts of
interest in legal services).
2 See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 11-13 (stating that, historically, the idealized
figure was the lawyer-statesman); Margulies, supra note 1, at 2363-64 (discussing
some of the concerns that legal services have when serving the interests of clients);
see also David L. Gregory, The Religious, the Ethical, the Communal, and the
Future, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 651, 661-63 (1992) (book review) (discussing the
importance of values and commitments in legal practice). Without a connection to
shared commitments, the grave sanctions that the law imposes lose legitimacy,
becoming a form of bureaucratic violence. See MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND THE
LAW 161 (1993) ("Where, however, the law itself is the problem, enforcing the law
only aggravates the wrong."); Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-
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The interaction of craft and commitment is a two-way
process. When commitments conflict, the application of craft is
crucial for reconciling disparate goals. Commitment, uninformed
by craft, can become an incandescent and insidious idol.
Talk of idols can illustrate the importance of this dialogue
between craft and commitment in religiously affiliated or "faith-
linked" law schools. Other schools may feel free to offer lip
service to the centrality of this interaction, but faith-linked law
schools have no such luxury. If faith-linked law schools have a
special mission, it is to model how craft informs commitment in
the creation of viable and just human institutions.
To articulate the contours of this mission, this article offers
an interpretation of the path-breaking "law book" of the three
Abrahamic religions3-the Book of Exodus. At the crucial
juncture of Exodus, God gives the Ten Commandments to Moses
only to discover the impatient Israelites worshipping the golden
calf. To resolve this dilemma, Moses must use craft to reconcile
his commitment to divine justice with his devotion to his people.
His solution reveals the importance of both craft and
commitment for the flourishing of law.4  Analysis of this
Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 47 (1983) (discussing how civil
disobedience can change the law); Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost
Traditions, 73 TEx. L. REV. 1139, 1149 (1995) (book review) ("Law can become an
alienating edifice setting up barriers between people and justice."). For a literate
rendering of the accommodations and explanations lawyers make in a world that
does not always reward deeper commitments, see generally LAWRENCE JOSEPH,
LAWYERLAND (1997).
3 See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 887-91 (providing the remarks of
Professor Azizah Y. al-Hibri, which discuss the role of Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam as Abrahamic faiths that comprise part of the "rich diversity" of religious
traditions in the United States). Islam has, in turn, influenced the development of
Anglo-American legal forms. See John A. Makdisi, The Islamic Origins of the
Common Law, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1635, 1688 (1999) (discussing Islamic contribution to
origins of common law doctrines and institutions such as trial by jury).
4 For another interpretation of Exodus that views Moses as embodying
prophetic commitment, and Moses' brother Aaron, founder of the Old Testament
priesthood, as embodying craft, see generally ROBERT A. BURT, TWO JEWISH
JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE PROMISED LAND (1988), which compares Moses to
Justice Brandeis and Aaron to Justice Felix Frankfurter. See also Marc Galanter, A
Vocation for Law? American Jewish Lawyers and Their Antecedents, 26 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1125, 1141-47 (1999) (viewing Jacob's son Joseph, whose experiences in
Egypt are recounted in Genesis 37-50, as an antecedent of Brandeis); Sanford
Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Construction of
Professional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1577, 1583-84 (1993) (discussing possible
roles of Jewish identity for lawyers); Russell G. Pearce, Jewish Lawyering in a
Multicultural Society: A Midrash on Levinson, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613, 1636-37
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interaction in Exodus can offer guidance to faith-linked law
schools at the start of the new millennium.
The first part of this article will discuss craft and
commitment as portrayed in Exodus, while the second part will
examine the role of faith-linked law schools in furthering this
interaction between craft and commitment. Inspired by the
theme of emigration and deliverance in Exodus, the second part
will look at modern-day journeys in two faith-linked contexts.
The first faith-linked context to be focused upon is the
asylum jurisprudence of Judge John Thomas Noonan of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, who has written widely about
the impact of Catholic teaching on the practice of law and legal
principle.5 Upon examination, it will be demonstrated that
Judge Noonan's asylum jurisprudence constitutes a form of
reflective craft that reconciles commitments to human dignity
and legal integrity. More importantly, it will show how his craft
offers a compelling example of the way faith-linked law schools
should treat doctrinal teaching.
Second, this article will recount the story of a refugee
detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) at
the Krome Detention Center in Miami, Florida. More
specifically, it will illustrate how this refugee pushed an INS
attorney, as well as a law professor and his students, to rethink
the relationship between craft and commitment.6 Ultimately,
this Article will conclude that clinics and other kinds of
community service can also teach the reflective commitment that
keeps faith with the message of Exodus.
I. EXODUS AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF CRAFT AND COMMITMENT
The story of the Jews' flight from Egypt and their
entrustment by God with the Ten Commandments should serve
as a starting point for this analysis. This account given in
Exodus centers upon the seeking of refuge from oppression and
(1993) (discussing same).
5 See John T. Noonan, Jr., The Heart of a Catholic Law School, 23 DAYTON L.
REV. 7, 8 (1997) ("There are great causes in the world linked to the imperative of
kindness-causes that should engage a Catholic lawyer and that a Catholic law
school should prepare and lead its students, moved by kindness, to engage in.").
6 See discussion infra Part lI.B. For a further analysis of the professional
growth possible in law school clinics, see generally Peter Margulies, The Mother
with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of
Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 695 (1994).
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the creation of law in that refuge.7 A better starting point on the
mission of faith-linked law schools would be difficult to find.
Exodus offers legal educators some powerful lessons about
commitment and craft. It reveals two broad strands of
commitment. The first, and better known, is the commitment to
the normative integrity of the law. Normative integrity refers to
fairness, equality, and the absence of the corruption that
decimates these virtues.8 The second commitment is the
commitment to humanity, with all of humanity's weaknesses
and imperfections. This commitment counsels kindness,
consideration of special circumstances, and the rejection of
rigidity and cruelty in the application of legal rules.9 Legal
education should foster the understanding that commitments to
normative integrity and humanity are interdependent in a just
legal system.10
Students should also learn, as Exodus illustrates, that
commitments only survive with the help of craft. Commentators
who relegate craft to an inferior status often seem more
7 The resonance of Exodus has extended throughout the ages. The Old and New
Testaments, as well as many of the world's legal systems, spring from the teachings
of Exodus. The central struggle of American law and politics, which is the
continuing battle of African-Americans for justice and equality, takes Exodus'
narrative of liberation as a central text. See PAUL GILROY, THE BLACK ATLANTIC:
MODERNITY AND DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS 207-08 (1993) (discussing the influence
of Exodus and other Old Testament narratives on civil rights leaders such as Martin
Luther King, Jr.); DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 253-55 (1994) (same); see also
MICHAEL WALZER, EXODUS AND REVOLUTION 61-66 (1985) (discussing the
influence of Exodus on subsequent theories of political action).
8 See Noonan, supra note 5, at 8-9 (discussing the evils of corruption, including
bribery).
9 The commitments to normative integrity and to humanity should be viewed
as a counterpart of the distinction between law and equity. See, e.g., Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 447-48 (N.Y. 1931) (analyzing the difference between
the equitable standard contract rescission, where the concern is to avoid harshness
to an injured party, and the higher legal standard for maintenance of an action for
misrepresentation, where the objective is to set clear standards of conduct).
10 Of course, these commitments can conflict. A microscopic inquiry into
individual circumstances will invariably uncover some factors that excuse
compliance with the law, leaving few rules standing. Conversely, the law can create
harshness by treating unlike cases in a mechanical fashion. Finding the right
balance of these commitments in individual cases is an art, not a science. Cf. Joseph
W. Bellacosa, A Millennial Renewal of the "Spirit of the Bar," 100 DICK. L. REV. 505,
507-08 (1996) (noting the dialectic between lawyers' human and professional
selves); Steven L. Winter, Legal Storytelling: The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon
Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2261-76
(1989) (following Karl Llewellyn in arguing that the lawyer's "situation sense," not
logical deduction from legal rules, is the best guide to just decisions).
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interested in the spontaneity of action than in the preservation
of commitments over time.1 This can be detrimental since craft
molds commitments into viable human institutions. Without
craft, commitments either lose their energy or, as in many
revolutions, consume the people who espouse them.'2 As Exodus
demonstrates, however, craft can also become an end in itself,
obscuring commitments instead of fulfilling them. Students
should learn both craft's virtues and its vices.
To further this learning, two broad strands of craft can be
identified in Exodus. The first strand is executory craft, which
involves the serving of one commitment as effectively as possible.
With this goal in mind, executory craft also includes choosing the
right time, the right forum, and the right metaphor 3 to make an
11 Cf. BALL, supra note 2, at 79-80 (drawing a distinction between religion and
revelation, and describing religion as a "self-limiting fixation"). Ball is in good
company in making this distinction between commitment and craft. Robert Burt
develops a similar point in distinguishing sharply between Justice Brandeis, the
prophet, and Justice Frankfurter, the high priest of law. See BURT, supra note 4, at
125-29. The late Robert Cover also made a similar distinction when he posited a
distinction between "myth" and "history." He viewed myth as "the part of reality we
create and choose to remember in order to reenact. It is intensely personal and
committed. History is a countermove bringing us back to reality, requiring that we
test the aspiration objectively and prudentially." Robert Cover, The Folktales of
Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS
OF ROBERT COVER 173, 187 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992) (emphasis added). This
dichotomy, wherever one finds it, seems overly stark Ball's separation between
revelation and religion neglects the fact that human beings often encounter
revelation in books like Exodus, written by a number of authors over time in a
conscious attempt to anchor faith in daily practice. Professor Burt's counterposing of
the Justices does not allow sufficient room for Brandeis's consummate legal craft, or
for Frankfurter's commitment to causes like the defense of the vilified anarchists
Sacco and Vanzetti. Similarly, Cover's distinction between myth and history
obscures the overlap between the two. Without a sense of history or craft, myth
cannot be created, remembered, or reenacted. Furthermore, what is called "reality"
or history would be very different without the power of myth and commitments.
12 See ALBERT O. HIRScHMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS: PRIVATE INTEREST
AND PUBLIC ACTION 100 (1982) (discussing how commitments in politics "often
develop a momentum of their own and take off in directions unanticipated by the
original sponsors and often unwelcome to them. This is the story of most
revolutions. . ."); Peter Margulies, Democratic Transitions and the Future of Asylum
Law, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 3, 26 & n.74 (2000) (noting instances when action against
oppression consumed its own most prominent actors, or led to an even greater
source of oppression).
13 See LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 24 (1967) ("Metaphor is the traditional
device of persuasion. Eliminate metaphor from the law and you have reduced its
power to convince and convert."); Winter, supra note 10, at 2256-57 (discussing the
connection between metaphor and Karl Llewellyn's conception of legal craft as
"situation sense").
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argument. Therefore, executory craft is necessary to the
flourishing of institutions, but not sufficient in situations where
commitments conflict.
The second strand of craft is reflective craft, which focuses
upon the difficult ,process of reconciling commitments, and
sometimes acknowledging that commitments cannot be
reconciled. 14 To see how craft and commitment interact in
Exodus, one should be made familiar with its story.
Exodus begins with an account of the enslavement of the
Jews in Egypt by the cruel Pharaoh and the birth of Moses. 15
Through the wit and courage of his mother and the kindness of
the Pharaoh's daughter, who adopted infant Moses as her own
son, Moses narrowly escaped Pharaoh's decree to kill the first-
born male of every Jewish family.16 Reared as an Egyptian
prince, Moses came to know of his Jewish heritage and hate the
slavery that his people endured.' 7 This became especially
apparent when Moses decided to flee Egypt after killing an
Egyptian who had beaten a Jewish slave.18
Years later, God appeared to Moses in the form of a burning
bush and commanded him to seek the deliverance of his people
in Egypt.19 Although Moses, aided by his brother Aaron, made a
compelling case for his people's freedom, Pharaoh's heart had
been hardened by God.20 God then sent the plagues, including
one which struck down the Egyptians' first-borns, but allowed
14 Part of this process is focusing on examples, including what lawyers call
"hard cases." See Paul R. Tremblay, The New Casuistry, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
489, 492 (1999) ("Casuistry starts with paradigm cases, examples upon which most
observers will readily agree, and reasons analogically from those agreed-upon cases
to more complex cases representing ethical conflict."). For an incisive analysis of a
particularly wrenching clash of commitments, see David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics,
and the First Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1030, 1043 (1995), which argues that African-American
lawyers have a special duty to refrain from undertaking certain kinds of
representation. A crucial aspect of the crafts of advocacy and adjudication is
resolving these hard cases in a manner which preserves the continuity of the legal
system while allowing for change. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-
LEGAL THEORY: PRAGMATISM AND A SocIAL THEORY OF LAW 167-75 (1997)
(discussing the process of legal change).
15 See Exodus 1:8-11, 2:1-2.
16 See id. at 1:22, 2:5-10.
17 See id. at 2:11 (recounting how Moses witnessed one of his friends being
struck by an Egyptian).
18 See id. at 2:12, 15.
19 See id. at 3:1-22.
20 See id. at 7:1, 6-13.
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the angel of death to pass over the houses of Jews.21 Pharaoh let
the Jews escape but pursued them to the Red Sea.22 The Red
Sea then parted, allowing the Jews to escape and leaving the
Egyptians who followed to perish.23 Following this incident, the
Jews wandered in the wilderness for forty years, sustained by
their still-fragile faith in God and by the manna that God
bestowed on them for nourishment. 24
When God convened with Moses to convey the Ten
Commandments, which are the foundation of the three
Abrahamic religions, the people grew restive.25 Aaron, seeking
to placate them, ordered them to fashion a golden calf to
worship.26 Seeing this as a violation of the Ten Commandments,
God sought to exterminate the Jews,27 but Moses then persuaded
God to relent.28 As punishment, however, God ordered the death
of many of those who fomented the rebellion, sparing only
Aaron 29 as the Jews continued their journey into the Promised
Land.30
Books of the Old Testament after Exodus described how the
Jews finally entered the Promised Land of Canaan.31 Moses
glimpsed the Promised Land from a mountaintop, but died a
lonely death before he could enter.32
Craft and commitment interact at every juncture of the
Exodus narrative. They are evident at the very start of Exodus
with the recounting of Moses' birth when his mother saved him
by sending him down the river in a makeshift ark.33 This showed
21 See id. at 7:14-29, 8:1-26, 9:1-35, 10:1-29, 11:1-10, 12:1-30.
22 See id. at 12:31-32, 14:6-9.
23 See id. at 14:20-22, 27-28.
24 See id. at 16:14-15, 31.
25 See id. at 19:3, 20:1, 32:1.
26 See id. at 32:2-6.
27 See id. at 32:7-10.
28 See id. at 32:11-14.
29 See id. at 32:25-35.
30 See id. at 33:1-6.
31 For details of this account, see generally Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy,
and Joshua.
32 See Deuteronomy 34:1-12.
33 Hannah Arendt, the Jewish political philosopher who has powerfully
explored the links between birth, hope, and human action, cites to the New
Testament's news that a child is born as its central text. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE
HUMAN CONDITION 247 (1958) ("It is this faith in and hope for the world that found
perhaps its most glorious and most succinct expression in the few words with which
the Gospels announced their 'glad tidings:' 'A child has been born unto us.' "). While
Moses is a prophet and lawgiver, not the son of God, the parallels between the Old
6732000]
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her commitment to God 34 since she entrusted her infant son to
His ministrations, freeing him to float on the water from which
life emerges. 35 Here, however, as throughout Exodus, craft
tempers commitment. This is evident when Moses' sister Miriam
followed the progress of the ark by concealing herself in the
bushes by the riverbank, while Moses' mother sent her
makeshift boat toward the spot where she knew Pharaoh's
daughter went regularly to bathe.36 By saving and adopting
Moses, Pharaoh's daughter showed her commitment to
humanity.37
When Moses grew into manhood as a prince of Egypt, he
inherited a sense of commitment from both his adopted and
biological mother. As a prince, Moses could have easily turned
his back on his people when he learned of his ties to the enslaved
Israelites. Instead, he "visited his kinsmen and witnessed their
forced labor."38 Angered by the cruelty and injustice of the Jews'
enslavement, Moses killed an Egyptian who had beaten a Jew.39
At this juncture, craft makes its first appearance as a hedge
against the consequences of commitment when Moses killed the
Egyptian only after he had looked around to see if anyone was
watching.40 Here, craft is ineffectual as Moses' deed became
known. Moses then fled Egypt, after Pharaoh sought to kill
him.41
The relationship between Moses' lack of craft and his
and New Testament in the treatment of birth and its possibilities for law are
significant. Cf. JONATHAN KIRSCH, MOSES: A LIFE 17-18 (1998) (noting the New
Testament's depiction of Moses as "the precursor of Christ").
34 The God of the Old Testament is sometimes called Jehovah or Yahweh.
When commentators use these names, the author includes them.
35 See MARTIN NOTH, EXODUS: A COMMENTARY 25-26 (1962) ("[Moses' mother
decided to] expose the... child to an uncertain fate... This 'uncertain fate'--as the
story with all its later developments intends us to understand-in fact means
Yahweh, but this is said neither explicitly nor obviously."). The water imagery here
is a recurrent feature in stories from antiquity about great kings and leaders. See
id. at 26-27 (noting similar themes in accounts from ancient Mesopotamia and the
historian Herodotus).
36 See Exodus 2:3-9.
37 Exodus tells us that Moses receives his name because it means "drawn out of
the water," here through God's providence. See Exodus 2:10 ("When the child grew,
she brought him to Pharaoh's daughter, who adopted him as her son and called him
Moses; for she said, 'I drew him out of the water.' ").
38 Id. at 2:11.
39 See id. at 2:11-12.
40 See id. at 2:12.
41 See id. at 2:14-15.
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commitment to remedying injustice returns to the fore when God
appeared to Moses in the form of a burning bush. In this
situation, Moses told God that he lacked the craft to be an
effective advocate for the Jews.42 While God clearly was annoyed
by Moses' proclivity for airing his reservations before doing God's
will,43 Moses' lack of craft here demonstrated his commitment.
Moses understood that the power of his message comes not from
his own strength, but from his commitment to sacred law.44 At
the same time, his reservations revealed a commitment to
humanity that could trump divine commands. These
reservations showed that true commitment flows from human
insight and judgment, not from a default position assumed by a
passive vehicle of God's will.45
Commitment involves the whole person, including the
character traits, idiosyncrasies, and disabilities that make
people human. God's relationship with Moses is closer, but also
more volatile, than His relationship with any other character in
the Old Testament.46 God also loves the Jews despite what He
42 See id. at 4:1-9. Moses responds by saying, "If you please, Lord, I have never
been eloquent, neither in the past, nor recently, nor now that you have spoken to
your servant; but I am slow of speech and tongue." Id. at 4:10. Some experts have
interpreted this passage as indicating that Moses had a disability that affected his
speech, such as a lisp or stammer. See KRSCH, supra note 33, at 7. But see 1
SHEMOTH, ComIENTARY 50-51 (A. J. Rosenberg trans., 1995) ("Is it possible that a
prophet whom the Lord met face to face and who received the Torah from His hand
stammered? ... Since [Moses] was to speak in public as God's representative, his
speech should be perfect."). As other commentators note, however, the fact that
Moses is not too quick to speak is in many ways a strength. See, e.g., 2 THE PENTA
TEUCH: EXODUS 44 (Samson Raphael Hirsch ed., 1989) (discussing the meaning of
Moses' disability).
43 Indeed, because of an unrelated dispute involving the failure to circumcise a
child, God sought to ambush and kill Moses shortly thereafter. This attempt would
have seriously changed the Exodus narrative if it had been successful. See Exodus 4:
24-26.
44 See 2 THE PENTATEUCH: EXODUS, supra note 42, at 44 (observing that
Moses' "utter lack of confidence in himself and his ability, is in itself the most vivid
proof of the divine origin of all that which was done and spoken by Moses, the most
vivid proof that the Torah was indeed given through Moses, but not by, or out of
Moses").
45 See KIRSCH, supra note 33, at 44 ("Moses not only keeps complete
consciousness, but also keeps and expresses the fullest independence of his own will
and his own ideas... This proves [that]... the Godly never comes over into the
sphere of the Human to such a degree that the human element in man is completely
'possessed' and becomes the passive instrument of the Godly without retaining a
will of its own.").
46 God's relationship with Moses sometimes seems like a prequel to Neil
Simon's The Sunshine Boys, in which two characters share respect, affection, and an
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calls their "stiff-necked" ways.47 After all, if God had wanted a
perfect specimen to do his bidding, He could have sent an
angel. 48  A commitment to humanity, however, means a
commitment to abiding imperfection, as well as the possibility of
grace.
Faced with Moses' reservations about his speaking ability,
God is willing to complement his commitment with craft of God's
own devise. The Lord counters Moses' objections by arguing that
Moses can rise to the task with His help: "Who gives one man
speech and makes another deaf and dumb? Or who gives sight to
one and makes another blind? Is it not I, the Lord?... It is I who
will assist you in speaking and will teach you what you are to
say."49 When Moses continues to hesitate, God loses patience and
asks, "Have you not your brother, Aaron the Levite? I know that
he is an eloquent speaker."50 God commands Moses to speak to
Aaron and decrees to Moses that Aaron will "speak to the people
for you: he shall be your spokesman."51
Aaron's role as Moses' "mouth" embodied the complex
interaction of craft and commitment in Exodus. At least one
commentator has argued that God's impatience with Moses
stems from God's apprehension that His message will be diluted
as it passes from the prophet Moses to the advocate Aaron.52
incurable tendency to get on each other's nerves. See THE SUNSHINE BOYS (Warner
Brothers Pictures 1975). In commentaries that have sprung up around Exodus over
the millennia, Ginzberg has God assert in exasperation at Moses' persistent fault-
finding: "Whence cometh now this effrontery of thine, that thou addressest Me as a
servant to his master? Thou speakest too many words by far... In sooth, thou
deservest severe chastisement but what can I do, seeing that I am the Master of
mercy?" LOUIS GINZBERG, LEGENDS OF THE BIBLE 320 (1956).
47 Exodus at 33:3.
48 Legends have God saying to Moses, "Perchance thou thinkest I have no
messengers, hosts, seraphim, ofanim, ministering angels, and Merkabah wheels, to
send to Egypt, to bring My children thence.. . ." GINZBERG, supra note 46, at 320.
49 Id. at 4:11-12.
50 Id. at 4:14.
51 Id. at 4:16.
52 RABBENU MEIR LEIBUSH BEN YECHIEL MICHEL, MALBIM: COMMENTARY ON
THE TORAH 126 (Zvi Faier trans., M.P. Press and Hillel Press 1978).
[With God] communicating with [the Jews] directly, they would have
heeded the divine words. But now, by Aaron receiving the communication
through Moses, and the people then receiving it from him, it would be a
communication of a different grade that it would otherwise have been....
The level of communication would not be as lofty as it would have been by
having [the Jews] hear it through Moshe directly.
[Vol.74:667
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Another commentator has noted how the craft of rhetoric can
become routine, mired in a re-upholstery of the "opinion, the
ideas, views, desires and efforts which . . . [people] already
have."53 Rhetoric can bolster the status quo and silence appeals
to a heightened sense of justice. In this manner, the craft of an
advocate always entails agendas that can conflict with
commitment.54
These concerns about the conflict between craft and
commitment ripen later in the Exodus narrative. The Jews,
after their liberation from slavery, were weary from wandering
in the wilderness. 55 They became angry about the delays in
reaching the Promised Land and Moses' disappearance to
commune with God. 56 Aaron sought to mollify them by bidding
them to assemble from their jewelry a golden calf, which they
proceeded to worship.57 In this episode, Martin Buber noted that
Aaron displayed lawyer-like virtues.58 In the conflict between
Moses' representatives and the impatient people, Buber
described Aaron "as [a] go-between."5 9 On this account, Aaron
urged the construction of the golden calf as a form of "mediation"
between Moses and the Jews.60 Such mediation, unfortunately,
broke one of the Ten Commandments: the prohibition against
idolatry.6' Aaron, acting as the "mouth" of Moses, 62 undermined
commitment here, leaving craft to spin off on its own idolatrous
path.63 Yet, this dim view of craft would be, at best, only a
partial picture of craft in Exodus. As in the case of Moses'
mother putting him in the ark, craft and commitment can serve
53 See KIRSCH, supra note 33, at 46 n.15.
5 See Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 GEO. L.J. 2567, 2640-43
(1993) (discussing how a lawyer's professional norms can silence a client's voice).
55 See Exodus 16:1-3.
56 See id. at 32:1.
57 See id. at 32:2-6.
58 See MARTIN BUBER, MOSES: THE REVELATION AND THE COVENANT 152 (1946)
(discussing how Aaron provided advice when this dilemma presented itself).
59 Id. at 152.
60 Id. Cf Steven F. Friedell, The "Different Voice" in Jewish Law: Some
Parallels to a Feminist Jurisprudence, 67 IND. L.J. 915, 919-23 (1992) (discussing
the role of compromise in Jewish law).
61 See BUBER, supra note 58, at 119 (noting that this prohibition was "the
starting point" in the tablets given to Moses); see also Exodus 20:2-4 ("You shall not
carve idols for yourselves in the shape of anything in the sky above or on the earth
below or in the waters beneath the earth . ..
62 BUBER, supra note 58, at 59.
63 See id. at 151-52.
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each other. The collaboration of Moses and Aaron in winning the
freedom of the Jews with God's help was the core example of this
relationship between craft and commitment. It seems after all
that the authors of Exodus took pains to insert Aaron64 to
celebrate the importance of craft in building institutions.
For much of Exodus, indeed, Moses served not just as a
prophetic figure, but also as an exemplar of the incompleteness
of commitment without craft. For Martin Buber, Moses' speech
impediment signaled the eternal gap either between God and
humanity, or between people and perfect justice.6 5 As Buber
noted, "Moses possesses no mastery over freely coursing speech.
He has been created thus and has been chosen thus."66 In this
way, "a barrier is raised between him and the human world."6 7
Thus, commitment without craft is ultimately an unworldly
exercise. It creates not ties between persons through thriving
institutions, but instead alienation and subsequent loneliness. 68
Indeed, the search for perfect justice can destroy the world, as
the history of bloody political commitments in this century
amply reveals.
The apex of the interaction between commitment and craft
in Exodus came when God prepared to destroy the Jews upon
seeing their lack of commitment to His commandments as
illustrated by their worship of the golden calf.6 9 Here, Moses
took what was best in his brother Aaron's skills to balance a
commitment to law with a commitment to humanity. Moses
could have easily insisted on the logic of a commitment to divine
law at this juncture, which would have required the destruction
of the Jews for violating the Ten Commandments. This was
God's initial argument in the aftermath of the golden calf
episode, as God recalled His vow that all those who worship idols
64 Scholars tend to think that Aaron was a later addition to Exodus, perhaps
serving as the embodiment of the institution-building that the Levite priests
practiced in Israel. See NOTH, supra note 35, at 46 (asserting that this appearance
of Aaron is a "secondary addition, made ... during the transmission of the [biblical]
tradition").
65 See BUBER, supra note 58, at 59.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 See id. ("He who has to establish the covenant between the people and [God]
is, so to speak, not accepted fully into the covenant of his tribe. Teacher, prophet,
law-giver; yet in the sphere of the word he remains insurmountably lonely...
69 See Exodus 32:3-11.
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would be destroyed.70 A merely executory sense of craft would
have turned murderous here, selecting the most effective way to
exterminate the Jews. Moses' craft caused the situation to take
a different turn.
Instead of agreeing to the logic of law, Moses counseled
against the wholesale destruction of his people.71 Moses first
invoked God's purpose in delivering the Jews from bondage, and
how the destruction of the Jews would frustrate that purpose:
Why, 0 Lord, should your wrath blaze up against your own
people, whom you brought out of the land of Egypt with such
great power and with so strong a hand? Why should the
Egyptians say, "With evil intent he brought them out, that he
might kill them in the mountains and exterminate them from
the face of the earth?"72
Moses next argued, according to the commentaries, that all
vows, including divine ones, are made to be broken when
fulfillment of the vows would engender harsh and unjust results.
On this account, a rigid obeisance to harsh rules is itself a kind
of slavery, one that degrades divine law into the decrees of a
despotic Pharaoh.73 Yet Moses, displaying his craft, also invoked
a commitment to law. He argued in the following passage that if
God makes rules, He must bind Himself as well as His human
subjects to their observance. Moses offers to absolve God of His
vow to destroy idol-worshipers, arguing:
0 Lord of the world! Hast not Thou given us the law of
absolution from a vow, whereby power is given to a learned
man to absolve any one from his vows?... [Elvery judge who
desires to have his decisions accounted valid, must subject
himself to the law, and Thou who hast prescribed the law of
absolution from vows through a learned man, must subject
Thyself to this law, and through me be absolved from Thy
VOW.
7 4
Faced with Moses' arguments, "the [L]ord relented in the
punishment he had threatened to inflict on his people."7 5 The
70 See id. at 32:7-11.
71 See id. at 32:11-14.
72 Id. at 32:11-12.
73 See Noonan, supra note 5, at 8, 14.
74 GINZBERG, supra note 46, at 403.
75 Exodus 32:14. Cf KIRSCH, supra note 33, at 266 (noting that Moses, "who
had complained to Yahweh that he was slow of speech now proved himself to be a
clever and highly effective advocate").
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Jews were punished, but they were not destroyed.
Exodus offers students and teachers a virtual seminar in the
interaction of craft and commitment. With commitment,
normative integrity emerges in God's giving of the Ten
Commandments to Moses. As illustrated by Moses' bloody
punishment of the idolatrous Israelites, such commitment is
never easy.76  Commitment to humanity, however, is also
manifested when Moses invoked this commitment to soften God's
anger at the Jews after the golden calf episode. 77
In Exodus, craft both undermines and aids commitment.
Executory craft is typified in the golden calf episode, where
tangibles supplant faith in the unseen. As the golden calf
episode demonstrated, craft can become an idol. To counter this
tendency, students need to also learn the reflective craft
evidenced in Exodus, as demonstrated by Moses arguing with
God to spare the Jews after their idolatry. Confronted by two
commitments-to divine law and to humanity-Moses decided to
use craft reflectively as he honored both commitments, doing
violence to neither.78
All in all, the prophet's practice offers a lesson for
contemporary legal education, particularly education in schools
affiliated with world religions that take Exodus as part of their
sacred canon. Honoring law and humanity through craft is the
best justification for the special place that lawyers occupy in
American culture. Imparting this kind of reflective craft to
students is the crucial challenge for today's faith-linked law
schools.
II. KEEPING FAITH WITH EXODUS IN CONTEMPORARY
LEGAL EDUCATION
Faith-linked law schools and scholars who identify
themselves in similar terms have a spectrum of options for
meeting the challenges of Exodus. In this section, two such
options will be elucidated, each linked with the themes of
76 See WALZER, supra note 7, at 55-66 (discussing Moses' harsh treatment of
the idolaters).
77 See Exodus 32:11-14.
78 For a view of criminal justice consistent with this notion, see Richard
Delgado, Goodbye to Hammurabi: Analyzing the Atavistic Appeal of Restorative
Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 751, 773-75 (2000), who argues for dialogue between
adversarial and mediation models in the criminal justice system.
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migration, refuge, and justice that Exodus developed. The first
approach, exemplified in the asylum law opinions of Judge John
Thomas Noonan, involves reconciling legal doctrine with a
commitment to humanity. The second approach, illustrated by
the case of a Somali refugee represented by the St. Thomas
University School of Law Immigration Clinic, entails the use of
clinical programs to teach students how commitment and craft
play out in the practice of law.
A. Humanity, Doctrine, and Craft in Judge Noonan's Asylum
Jurisprudence
The contributions of Judge John Thomas Noonan of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the area of refugee rights
demonstrate the use of reflective craft to balance commitments
to humanity with the rule of law. Support for refugees' rights is
unequivocal in religious teaching, which Judge Noonan has
acknowledged as a source of his commitments. 79 Asylum for
those seeking refuge from oppression is a core element of
Catholic doctrine. Indeed, concern for the dislocation and
vulnerability of refugees dates back to the Book of Exodus itself,
where Moses famously proclaimed that he has been a "stranger
in a foreign land."80
Immigration law presents a challenging problem in the
reconciliation of commitments to normative integrity and
humanity. On the one hand, American immigration law clearly
forbids entry or continued presence in this country without the
required documents.81 On the other hand, various forms of
affirmative relief, including grants of asylum, operate to take
individual circumstances into account and avoid injustice.8 2
Asylum law grants refugee status to those persons who can
79 See Noonan, supra note 5, at 12 (suggesting that religious instructions will
lay the foundation of kindness, which is so desperately needed in today's justice
system).
80 Exodus 2:22.
81 See 8 U.S.C. § 1181(a) (1994) (providing that "no immigrant shall be
admitted into the United States unless at the time of application for admission he
(1) has a valid unexpired immigrant visa or was born subsequent to the issuance of
such visa of the accompanying parent, and (2) presents a valid unexpired passport
or other suitable travel document or document of identity and nationality....").
82 Judge Noonan argues that such values are central to the mission of a
Catholic law school, whose graduates, he envisions, will know the value of simple
"kindness" and will not be restricted by "bureaucratic rigidity and regularity and
purposeless enforcement of rules." Noonan, supra note 5, at 8.
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prove that they have a "well-founded fear" of persecution based
on race, religion, national origin, membership in a particular
social group, or holding a particular political opinion, if they
return to their country of origin.8 3 Yet, even in asylum law,
formalistic interpretation can frustrate humanitarian
purposes.8 4 Judge Noonan has employed craft to reconcile a
commitment to immigration control with a commitment to
humanitarian sentiments.
For example, in Lazo-Majano v. INS,85 which was a case
involving a woman who was raped, beaten, and tortured over
time by a Salvadorean army sergeant,8 6 Judge Noonan wrote the
first significant opinion holding that a survivor of gender-based
oppression was entitled to asylum.8 7  In Lazo-Majano, the
appellant had endured appalling cruelty.88 For instance, her
torturer placed live hand grenades against her forehead, forced
83 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (Supp. IV 1998). See also DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW
OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 290-411 (3d ed. 1999) (providing commentary on
the various grounds of refugee status). This does not mean that immigration
controls have been applied neutrally, without regard to race, national origin, or
other factors that would be suspect in other areas of law. Under the plenary power
doctrine, Congress has been free to use such factors, and historically has done so,
through now-repealed legislation such as the Chinese Exclusion Act of the last
century, which stripped thousands of lawful immigrants of their status. See
generally Tanya K. Hernandez, The Construction of Race and Class Buffers in the
Structure of Immigration Controls and Laws, 76 OR. L. REV. 731 (1997) (discussing
the influence of race on immigration policy); Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the
Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A "Magic Mirror" into the Heart of
Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111 (1998) (discussing same).
84 See Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion
and Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 731-45 (1997)
(criticizing deference to administrative agencies that attach little importance to
fairness or humanitarian objectives); Peter Margulies, Democratic Transitions and
the Future ofAsylum Law, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 3, 4-26 (2000) (discussing the threat
to asylum stemming from excessive deference to the State Department view that
conditions in asylum-seekers' countries of origin have improved, when the State
Department view relies on formal criteria like a change in rulers or an uneventful
election, rather than actual conditions "on the ground" for refugees).
85 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled in part on other grounds, Fisher v.
INS, 79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
86 See id. at 1433.
87 Violence against women has become a salient concern for immigration law in
the past decade. See generally Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Sex, Culture,
and Rights: A Reconceptualization of Violence for the Twenty-First Century, 60 ALB.
L. REV. 607 (1997) (developing a new paradigm for analyzing gender, power,
culture, and rights); Linda Kelly, Stories from the Front: Seeking Refuge for Battered
Immigrants in the Violence Against Women Act, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 665 (1998)
(analyzing immigration legislation on violence against women).
88 See Lazo-Majano, 813 F.2d at 1433.
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her to eat her own shredded identity card, and pummeled her in
the face until a blood clot formed in her eye.89 The problem
Judge Noonan confronted is that the Refugee Act did not make
persecution based on gender an express ground for asylum.90
The most common ground for asylum, which is persecution
based on political opinion,91 was not an obvious choice in Lazo-
Majano.92 Here, the appellant was just an average person, not a
prominent political advocate.9 3 Judge Noonan, however, was
able to liken the applicant's resistance to a political opinion.94
More specifically, he espoused the view that no person should be
humiliated in such a manner.95 To vindicate the humanity that
gender oppression obscures, Judge Noonan was even willing to
consider credible and persuasive evidence not in the record,9 6
and take into account changes in the law that reduced the
impact of stereotypes.9 7
Judge Noonan's commitment to humanity, his disdain for
mechanical rules, and his sense of reflective craft are evident not
only on issues of gender and asylum, but also throughout his
89 See id.
90 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1998) (providing that asylum is granted if
an "alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title"). An
alien may be considered a refugee if he or she fears persecution due to "race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (Supp. IV 1998).
91 See Marquez v. INS, 105 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that political
opinion is the most common statutory ground upon which eligibility for political
asylum is based).
92 See Lazo-Majano, 813 F.2d at 1434-36 (explaining why the person who
sought asylum had a political opinion).
93 See id. at 1435.
94 See id. at 1435-36.
95 Courts have also invoked the desperation of refugees as an analogy outside of
immigration law to support changes in rules that would otherwise be unduly harsh.
See People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1914) (ruling that the duty of retreat
in self-defense doctrine did not require a person attacked in his own home to retreat
from his dwelling before using deadly force). In that case, Judge Cardozo observed
that a person in this plight "is under no duty to take to the fields and the highways,
a fugitive from his own home." Id. Cardozo's insight has special resonance for
women attacked in their homes by intimate partners. See Weiand v. State, 732 So.
2d 1044, 1058 (Fla. 1999) (holding that self-defense doctrine does not require retreat
from home prior to using deadly force if necessary to repel an attack by a co-
habitant).
96 See Lazo-Majano, 813 F.2d at 1435 (considering reports of persons being
tortured upon deportation to El Salvador that were not in the record).
97 See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 967-973 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Noonan,
J., dissenting) (urging remand of a case involving gender and asylum to allow
application of new INS guidelines on gender).
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asylum jurisprudence. For example, in Kazlauskas v. INS,98 a
case involving issues of religious freedom, this commitment led
Judge Noonan to a broader understanding of what constitutes
"persecution" in asylum cases. 99 In the dissenting opinion in
Kazlauskas, he voiced his belief that the immigration judge
ignored the applicant's family's subjection to recurrent house
arrest and the applicant's harassment as a child by his school
teachers. 100 Furthermore, Judge Noonan contended that animus
toward the family's religious beliefs did not rise to the level of
persecution under the Refugee Act. 1 1  While the majority
apparently wanted to see physical scars as emblems of
persecution, Judge Noonan considered emotional and spiritual
harm to be sufficient evidence of persecution.10 2
B. The Case of the Reluctant Refugee: Learning Craft and
Commitment in Law School Clinics
Religious belief and physical scars also figure in the asylum
narrative offered here as an example of the value of clinical
education in teaching reflective craft. 10 3 This story took place
not in the desert locale of Exodus, but in the tropics. There, the
INS operates a detention facility called Krome, which is
southwest of Miami in the fringes of the Everglades. Krome is a
low-lying encampment where the crisp sounds of INS officers
taking target practice greet visitors in the parking lot. Final
asylum hearings at Krome have high stakes. Namely, if
detainees win, they secure asylum and an opportunity to become
lawful permanent residents of the United States. On the other
98 46 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 1995).
99 See id. at 907 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
100 See id. at 908.
101 See id.
102 See id.
103 The clinical ideal of learning through reflection on doing has strong religious
parallels. As a modem Talmudic scholar, Rabbi Soloveitchik, put it,
the service of God... can be carried out only through the implementation,
the actualization of its principles in the real world... The halacha [or
religious law] is not hermetically enclosed within the confines of cult
sanctuaries but penetrates into every nook and cranny of life. The
marketplace, the street, the factory, the house, the meeting place, the
banquet hall, all constitute the backdrop for religious life.
JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, HALAKHIC MAN 94 (Lawrence Kaplan trans., 1983), cited
in Samuel J. Levine, Halacha and Aggada: Translating Robert Cover's Nomos and
Narrative, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 465, 484 n.100.
[Vol.74:667
LESSONS IN EXODUS
hand, if they lose, INS quickly puts them on a plane back to their
country of origin, allowing them to face potential threats.
A compelling case from Krome was referred to the St.
Thomas Unviersity School of Law Immigration Clinic.10 4 The
case involved a Somali refugee who shall be called Delara
Mohamed for the purposes of this article. 10 5 Ms. Mohamed was a
young woman who witnessed her father's killing by soldiers of
General Aidid, the Somali leader who had defied the United
Nations forces intervening in Somalia in the early 1990s. The
soldiers who killed Ms. Mohamed's father had also tried to rape
her, and had bayoneted her when she resisted. 106 While Ms.
Mohamed told us that she had scars on one of her breasts, and
on her ankle from this attack,107 she cautioned that, as a strict
Moslem sworn to vows of modesty, she could not show her scars
to anyone or discuss them in open court. 08
Ms. Mohamed's refusal to show or discuss her scars was a
tremendous impediment to the students' and my own sense of
executory craft. Although the fundamental commitment was to
effectively represent asylum claimants, their ability to effectuate
that commitment was severely hampered. Since her scars were
important evidence of past persecution, crucial for prevailing on
her asylum claim, 0 9 Ms. Mohamed's beliefs were preventing
effective representation." 0
In retrospect, the impatience exhibited with Ms. Mohamed's
beliefs was ironic. While St. Thomas University is a diocesan
104 The author started the Immigration Clinic in 1992 and currently co-teaches
it with his colleague, Professor Linda Kelly.
105 I related this story in a recent article on empathy in clinical work. See Peter
Margulies, Re-Framing Empathy in Clinical Legal Education, 5 CLINICAL L. REV.
605, 634 (1999) (discussing the necessity of empathy for a client's religious
commitments).
105 See id. at 634.
107 See id.
103 See id.
109 To the extent that Ms. Mohamed's refusal to show or testify in detail about
her scars meant that her harrowing story as presented at her asylum hearing would
be incomplete, this situation posed a conflict between client wishes and the
imperatives of effective legal storytelling. For an incisive study of this conflict, see
John B. Mitchell, Narrative and Client-Centered Representation: What is a True
Believer to Do When His Two Favorite Theories Collide?, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 85, 97-
104 (1999), which analyzes the sources of conflict between "narrative and client-
centered representation."
110 Ms. Mohamed may have been willing to permit a doctor to examine her. In
the expedited schedule for hearings at Krome, however, getting a doctor in time
would have been quite difficult.
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institution, those working with Ms. Mohamed reacted as if her
position was merely one of personal etiquette-an issue of taste
that should bow to the imperatives of case processing. This
narrow focus on craft neglected the fact that Ms. Mohamed's
beliefs were a constitutive element of her humanity. "Effective
representation" without respect for those beliefs was little more
than worship of craft unmoored from crucial commitments-an
echo of the Israelites' assembly of the golden calf."'
Realizing the importance of Ms. Mohamed's religious
commitments did not, however, make her asylum case any easier
to win. Without testimony about her scars, she might have
found herself and her commitments on the next plane back to
Somalia, where the respect accorded to commitments varies with
the caliber of the bullets accompanying them. Ultimately, our
client came up with a rather unorthodox solution.112 The INS
attorney in the asylum case was a woman.11 3 Our client told us
she would allow herself to be examined by the INS attorney in
private, and would allow the INS attorney to report about the
results of her examination to the court.114
To appreciate the novelty of Ms. Mohamed's suggestion, it is
useful to know more about the particular blend of craft and
commitment displayed by the INS trial attorney at Krome. 115
The INS trial attorney's job is, for the most part, to see to it that
asylum applicants lose as many hearings as possible, as quickly
as possible, so that the federal government pays as little as
possible for their maintenance in detention facilities. There is a
craft to the role of this type of attorney, even if this craft seems a
little emotionally cold.
The INS trial attorney's craft flows from the adversarial
M See Exodus 32:1-5. For further commentary on these lawyering issues, see
generally GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING (1992); Alfieri, supra note 54;
Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEO. L.J. 2533 (1993); Richard Delgado,
Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy and False Empathy, 84 CAL. L. REV. 61
(1996); Margulies, supra note 6; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives:
Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1994).
112 See Margulies, supra note 105, at 634 (discussing Ms. Mohamed's
"unorthodox solution").
113 See id.
114 See id.
115 I have great respect for INS attorneys, who include a former professor at the
St. Thomas immigration Clinic, as well as Clinic alumni. As this paragraph
explains, however, I have little evidence that INS attorneys are disposed routinely
to support asylum claimants' positions and corroborate their testimony.
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nature of asylum hearings. Once the asylum seeker has testified
before an immigration judge, the attorney endeavors to discredit
her on cross-examination. The task of impeachment may involve
making a great deal out of seemingly minor issues. For example,
the asylum application form, known as the 1-589, requires each
asylum-seeker to list past residences. In completing this section
of the 1-589, an asylum seeker might fail to list a street address
for her former residence in her country of origin. This omission
would be particularly likely if the asylum seeker were from a
rural area in a third-world country, where street addresses are
not ubiquitous. True to the cross-examiner's maxim, "False in
one, false in all," the INS trial attorney might highlight this
absent address as evidence that the asylum seeker was also
offering incomplete information about the rest of her claim."
6
For some immigration judges, lack of a street address would
render the asylum-seeker incredible.
The INS attorney in this case, who shall be called Betty
Johnson for the purposes of this article, was good at her craft.
Indeed, other refugee lawyers warned me about her. Given Ms.
Johnson's reputation, it seemed perverse to even consider Ms.
Mohamed's suggestion that Ms. Johnson's assistance be enlisted.
One additional fact, however, cut in a different direction: Ms.
Johnson was the person who had referred this case to the
Immigration Clinic.117
It turned out that Ms. Mohamed who, like many Somalis,
spoke English, had struck up an acquaintance with Ms. Johnson
in the cramped quarters reserved for Immigration Court at
Krome. The upshot was that Ms. Johnson, instead of viewing
Ms. Mohamed as an unwanted intruder, viewed her in the
human terms with which Exodus describes the immigrant, as "a
stranger in a foreign land."118 Ms. Mohamed believed that when
116 See generally Peter Margulies, Difference and Distrust in Asylum Law:
Haitian and Holocaust Refugee Narratives, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 135, 137-44
(1994) (discussing attacks on credibility of Haitian refugees). The stark routine
involved in impeaching asylum claimants parallels routines in other areas of law.
See, e.g., JOSEPH, supra note 2, at 105, in which one lawyer noted:
[Corporate clients] want a document, a piece of paper, that's it. It's not a
whole lot different from a form will. You go into the computer, pull out a
prior deal, move provisions around, fill in the names of the parties, change
some words here and there. Suggest a few more hours of work to put in,
quote, the nuances, and you're told no, sorry. They'l go somewhere else.
117 See Margulies, supra note 105, at 634.
118 Exodus 2:22. The acquaintance between Ms. Mohamed and Ms. Johnson
20001
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
push came to shove, Ms. Johnson would help. Yet, Ms. Johnson
could well have viewed her acquaintance with Ms. Mohamed in a
much less expansive light, as requiring only the referral that she
had already made. Therefore, the question remained whether
Ms. Johnson, given her long-standing commitment to efficient
immigration enforcement, could find room for another
commitment in her conception of craft.
Nonetheless, the risk was taken.119 Ms. Johnson examined
Ms. Mohamed. At the asylum hearing, she reported her findings
in detail to the immigration judge. In essence, her findings
corroborated Ms. Mohamed's account.120 After the immigration
judge announced that asylum was won, an impromptu party
ensued in the courtroom. 121  Ms. Mohamed embraced Ms.
Johnson, and the judge beamed. 122 At least for those moments,
the sounds of celebration drowned out the sounds of target
practice taking place nearby.
Ms. Mohamed's story has little in common with Exodus. Ms.
Mohamed's Promised Land was not Palestine, but Seattle, where
a cousin and a large Somali community awaited her. This
author and his students, all males, were poor stand-ins for
Moses' mother and devoted sister. Ms. Johnson, an experienced
professional, was not in the habit of seeing herself as an
Egyptian princess. Yet, Ms. Mohamed's obstinate faith in her
own humanity, and in the humanity of those around her, seemed
in a modest fashion to partake of the spirit of prophecy. Pushed
by Ms. Mohamed's commitment, everyone reflected on and
revised their conceptions of craft. While the ordinary course of
business beckons daily, we will never be quite the same again.
leavened the impersonal view of the "other" that often triumphs in large
bureaucratic organizations. Cf. Amy R. Mashburn, Pragmatism and Paradox:
Reinhold Niebuhr's Critical Social Ethic and the Regulation of Lawyers, 6 GEo. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 737, 757 (1993) (arguing that in large communities, ethical concerns
wane because "individuals no longer relate to one another in a personal-or
'organic'-manner").
119 In taking this approach, my students and I acted consistently with
commentary urging a greater client role in developing legal strategy. See generally
Alfieri, supra note 54; Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking:
Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979).
120 Ms. Johnson did not turn her back completely on her commitment to
efficient immigration enforcement. She noted some inconsistencies regarding dates
in our client's story. She framed her presentation, however, in a way that signaled
she did not regard these inconsistencies as dispositive.
121 See Margulies, supra note 105, at 634.
122 See id.
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CONCLUSION
The reflective commitment discussed here never comes
easily. As Exodus reveals, human beings yearn for routine. This
is true even when, as in the case of the Israelites worshiping the
golden calf, they should know that something very much out of
the routine, something that creates new commitments, is near.
The risks born of commitment, from Moses' mother's launching
of the makeshift ark carrying her son on the river to Ms.
Mohamed's trusting Ms. Johnson, respond to special challenges.
The golden calf's construction, with its reversion to the routine of
making things instead of keeping faith, is all too typical of the
way in which society and persons schooled in the law fall back on
routine as a hedge against risk.
Yet, as Exodus reveals, craft need not have such a
mechanical nature. Craft can be reflective, not routine, helping
to make sense of the commitments in tension with each other,
such as commitments to law's integrity and to concern for
persons. Moses models this reflective craft when he persuaded
God to spare the Jews after the golden calf episode in order to
show concern for human weakness and vindicate the liberating
purpose of God's intervention on behalf of the Jews enslaved in
Egypt. In the more modern context of migration and law, Judge
Noonan models a similar reflective commitment in expanding
narrow definitions that disadvantage refugees. Ms. Mohamed
pushed Betty Johnson, myself, and my students to live up to
Judge Noonan's example, as we tried to preserve our client's
faith and life, as well as uphold the integrity and underlying
purposes of immigration law.
Faith-linked law schools can honor the lessons of Exodus by
questioning legal doctrine in the name of concern for persons and
public purposes, and by adding a community service dimension
to their curricula through clinics and other programs that offer
students an opportunity to develop reflective commitments.
Moses and Aaron are no longer with us, in a physical sense.
Their physical reality, however, matters far less than our
memory of their example. That memory can inspire a renewed
dedication to teaching commitment and craft for the community
of faith-linked law schools. The urgency of that task is the
crucial lesson of Exodus.
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